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HOW NOT TO ARGUE THAT REASONABLE PROVOCATION
IS AN EXCUSE
Peter Westen*
Reid Fontaine draws two conclusions regarding the partial de-
fense to murder of reasonable provocation-one regarding its
substantive content, the other regarding its formal classification:
(1) Substantive Content. Fontaine implicitly concludes
that, with respect to defenses framed in terms of
"reasonable" or "adequate" provocation, an actor
who kills one or more victims ought to possess a
partial defense of reasonable provocation if, based
upon what the actor believes (whether he believes it
reasonably or unreasonably), the actor suffers an
indignity or experiences an outrage that leaves him
so emotionally aroused-and that in a jury's judg-
ment would leave a person of reasonable values so
emotionally aroused-that the actor finds it diffi-
cult, though admittedly not impossible, to resist the
killing.'
(2) Formal Classification. Fontaine concludes that the
partial defense of reasonable provocation ought to
be classified in its entirety as a partial excuse-and
not even partly as a partial justification.
I agree with both of Fontaine's two conclusions, and, indeed, I
have previously written to that effect.2 Unfortunately, while I agree
with Fontaine's conclusions, I do not think he adequately supports
them. Fontaine's arguments in favor of Conclusions 1 and 2 are
not likely to persuade anyone except those who already accept
them.
I will address Fontaine's arguments in Parts I and II and offer my
own supporting arguments in Part III. Before I do, however, I
should say something about how he approaches the relationship
between Conclusions 1 and 2. As between the two, Conclusion 1 is
* Frank G. Millard Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Michigan. I want to
thank Marcia Baron for reading and commenting on an earlier draft.
1. I infer this from the way Fontaine would resolve the cases he classifies as 1 (a), 1 (b),
2(a), and 2(b), and from his approval of MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1980), which,
in abandoning references to "provocation," goes even further toward exculpation.
2. See Peter Westen, Individualizing the Reasonable Person In Criminal Law, 2 CRIM. L. &
PHIL. 137, 155-59 (2008).
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fundamental, while Conclusion 2 is derivative. That is to say, one
cannot formally classify a partial defense of reasonable provocation
as an "excuse" rather than a 'justification" without first establishing
its substantive content. Once one establishes its substantive content
in accord with Conclusion 1, its formal classification is self-evident.
The partial defense set forth in Conclusion 1 is self-evidently a par-
tial excuse because it consists entirely of (i) what an actor believes
(as opposed to what is true), (ii) how much he is agitated (as op-
posed to how much his victim deserves to suffer), and (iii) the
degree to which he finds it difficult, albeit not impossible, to resist
doing what the law emphatically wishes him to resist doing-
namely, killing in anger.
Accordingly, I would expect Fontaine to proceed, first, by advo-
cating Conclusion 1 and, then, taking the evident step of drawing
Conclusion 2. Instead, Fontaine does the opposite. He starts and
largely ends by claiming to establish that reasonable provocation is
a partial excuse, and he does so because he implicitly assumes that
if reasonable provocation is a partial excuse, its substantive content
must consist of Conclusion 1. I think he is mistaken on both
counts: he fails to demonstrate that reasonable provocation is en-
tirely a partial excuse, and he fallaciously assumes that in so far as
reasonable provocation is entirely a partial excuse, its substantive
content must correspond to the defense set forth in Conclusion 1.
I. FONTAINE'S ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXCUSE
Fontaine makes several arguments in support of treating reason-
able provocation as entirely a partial excuse, all of which are
questionable.
A. Appellate Rulings in Adequate Non-Provocation Cases
Fontaine's principal argument is to invoke appellate rulings that
sustain the defense in what Fontaine calls instances of "adequate
non-provocation"-which are to be distinguished from what I shall
call "classic provocation" cases (and what Fontaine calls "adequate
provocation" cases) .3 "Classic provocation" cases consist of non-
mistaken and non-accidental homicides that are directed against
3. Reid Fontaine, Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as Excuse Not Justifica-
tion, 43 U. MICH. J.L., REFORM 27, 33-34 (2009). For the use of "reasonable" rather than
"adequate," see Andrew von Hirsh & Nils Jareborg, Provocation and Culpability, in RESPONSI-
BILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIoNs 252 n.35 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).
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the sources of reasonable provocation.4 Fontaine's "adequate non-
provocation" cases consist of ones in which, although the indignity
or outrage that an actor perceives is otherwise adequate in law, the
person who falls victim to the actor's homicidal rage did not inflict
that indignity upon the actor or cause the outrage. Fontaine fur-
ther divides such adequate non-provocation cases into four subsets.
1. Actors who are not provoked by anyone.
a. Reasonable mistake. An actor, A, intentionally kills
V, while reasonably but mistakenly believing that V
inflicted an indignity or outrage that leaves A feel-
ing homicidal rage.
b. Unreasonable mistake." An actor, A, intentionally
kills V, while unreasonably and mistakenly believing
that V inflicted an indignity or outrage that leaves A
feeling homicidal rage.
2. The actor, though provoked, was not provoked by
his victim.
a. Accidental homicide.7 An actor, A, intending to kill
the source of his provocation, S, accidentally kills V
instead.
b. Intentional homicide of a non-provoker.8 An actor,
A, provoked by S, intentionally kills a non-provoker,
V, whom A associates with S-say, S's child or par-
ent.
Fontaine identifies appellate rulings within each subset that sustain
the partial defense of reasonable provocation, despite being ade-
quate non-provocation cases. He offers those decisions as evidence
that reasonable provocation is a partial excuse.
I think that Fontaine is mistaken in three respects. His first mis-
take concerns subsets 1 (a), 1 (b), and 2(a). Even if one assumes,
arguendo, that Fontaine's appellate rulings show that those subsets
of adequate non-provocation are partial excuses within those juris-
dictions, it does not follow that classic provocation cases within
those jurisdictions-non-mistaken and non-accidental homicides
in reasonable provocation-are also entirely partial excuses. On
the contrary, the appellate rulings in subsets 1(a), 1 (b), and 2(a)
4. I take the term "classic" from Finbarr McAuley, Anticipating the Past: The Defence of
Provocation In Irish Law, 50 MOD. L. REV. 133, 152-55 (1987). See also id. at 140-41 (referring
to the "paradigm" of reasonable provocation).
5. Fontaine, supra note 3, at 34.
6. Id. at 36.
7. Id. at 38 (describing this as "unintentional misdirection").
8. Id. (describing this as "kno.ing/intentional misdirection").
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are consistent with the position that, while mistaken and accidental
homicides in reasonable heat of passion may be partially excused,
the reason they are partially excused is that, if they were not mis-
taken or accidental-that is, if they constituted classic provocation
cases-they would be partially justified.
To illustrate this proposition, consider an analogy in the area of
self-defense. Assume that the following cases arise:
(1) Self-defense-an actor, A, kills a person, P, rightly be-
lieving that killing P is necessary to prevent P from
imminently and wrongly killing A;
(2) Accident in self-defense--an actor, A, rightly believing
that killing P is necessary to prevent P from immi-
nently and wrongly killing A, attempts to kill P but
accidentally also kills V; and
(3) Mistaken self-defense--an actor, A, kills a person, P,
while honestly but mistakenly believing that killing
P is necessary to prevent P from imminently and
wrongly killing A.
Every jurisdiction provides a complete defense in 1. Most juris-
dictions provide complete or partial defenses in 2 and 3,
depending upon whether the accidents or mistakes were reason-
able. However, even if one assumes, arguendo, that the defenses in 2
and 3 are partial excuses, it does not follow that the defense in 1 is
also an excuse. On the contrary, the defense in 1 is a classic in-
stance ofjustified self-defense. The reason that defenses in 2 and 3
are complete or partial excuses is that they are homicides that,
were they not mistaken or accidental, would bejustified.
To be sure, Fontaine argues that if any homicides in reasonable
heat of passion are partial excuses within a jurisdiction, including
mistaken and accidental homicides, then all homicides in reason-
able heat of passion must also be partial excuses within that
jurisdiction. He takes this position because he thinks it follows
from the premise that justification and excuse are mutually exclu-
sive grounds of exculpation and hence cannot apply to the same
conduct. Fontaine puts it as follows:
[Excuse] "admits to the existence of a social harm" and to the
wrongfulness of the act. In contrast, a justification is an asser-
tion that the act is acceptable and makes no such concession.
In this way, excuse is a lower moral standard than justification,
and, as such, the defense cannot be a justification (requiring
it to always meet this higher moral standard) if it can, at any
.[VOL. 43:1
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time or in any instance, be rationalized and viewed as an ex-
9
cuse.
I agree with Fontaine that justification and excuse are mutually
exclusive in that when a single instance of conduct is justified, it
lacks anything to be excused (and vice versa). However, the cases at
issue are quite distinct. Rather than involving a single instance of
conduct that, if justified, is no longer a subject of excuse (and vice
versa), they involve discrete instances of conduct-some of which
are instances of mistaken reasonable heat of passion, and others of
which are instances of non-mistaken reasonable heat of passion.
That justification and excuse are mutually exclusive with respect to
any single instance of conduct does not prevent some instances
from being justified while others are excused. Indeed, Fontaine
later concedes as much in discussing self-defense.' °
Second, if it is true that non-mistaken and non-accidental homi-
cides in heat of passion constitute partial justifications (as we must
assume till Fontaine demonstrates otherwise), some commentators
would go further and claim subset 1 (a) constitutes partial justifica-
tions, too (subset 1 (a), it will be recalled, consists of cases in which
actors act reasonably and in good faith, albeit in ways that result in
mistakes). Some commentators take the position that 'justified"
conduct includes conduct that is reasonable and in good faith,
even if it turns out to be unfortunate." Fontaine may disagree with
that view of justification and excuse, as I do. 2 But he cannot claim
that subset 1 (a) constitutes partial excuses without defending his
view of justification and excuse against those who advance an al-
ternative view.
Third, and finally, regardless of how many appellate rulings
Fontaine may cite in support of exculpation in subsets 1 (a), 1 (b),
2(a) and 2(b)-and, as he must admit, he cites relatively few-they
cannot possibly do the work that Fontaine expects of them.
Fontaine's goal, after all, is to persuade readers that the partial de-
fense of reasonable provocation ought to consist of certain
substantive elements, including those subsets. One cannot prove
what the defense ought to be by pointing to what it occasionally or
even frequently is. If Fontaine is right that reasonable provocation
ought to consist of the elements set forth in Conclusion 1, nothing
in appellate rulings can possibly hurt him. By the same token,
9. Id. at 42 (footnotes omitted).
10. See id. at 50 (discussing self-defense).
11. Cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09 (1980) (predicating complete 'justification" entirely
on what actors reasonably believe).
12. SeePeter Westen, An Attitudinal Theory of Excuse, 25 L. & PHIL. 289 (2006).
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however, if Fontaine is wrong and reasonable provocation ought to
consist of prompt and unmistaken killings by reasonably provoked
parties of persons who actually provoke them, nothing in appellate
rulings can much help him.
13
To be sure, the existence of supporting case law does establish
one thing: it shows that certain legal rules are possible. "Ought"
does presuppose "can." Hence, by showing that a legal rule can ex-
ist, its advocates can negate one argument that might otherwise be
used to deny that it ought to exist. However, that hardly supports
Fontaine's use of appellate rulings. The existence of MPC
§ 210.3(1) (b) within the jurisdictions that have adopted it proves
that rules which correspond with Conclusion 1 are possible.
B. Justification as Prevention of "Further Unjust Harm"
Fontaine's next argument is premised upon an assertion regard-
ing legal theory rather than positive law. Fontaine asserts that
homicides in reasonable provocation cannot be regarded as par-
tially justified because they fall outside what the law regards as
justified conduct. An actor is justified in killing another, he says,
only "to prevent further unjust harm [to himself or another] "14 and
to prevent "greater unjust harm. 1"
13. Fontaine recognizes that these decided cases (which favor his position) do not in
themselves "make the doctrine one of excuse." Nevertheless, he argues that the cases implic-
itly buttress his position because rejecting his position means deeming the cases to be "dead
wrong." Fontaine, supra note 3, at 42. Unfortunately, Fontaine does not acknowledge that,
given the conflict in case law regarding whether reasonable provocation is justification or
excuse, id. at 28-29, 41, accepting Fontaine's position also means deeming many cases to be
"dead wrong"-namely, the many cases, some of them in the majority, that reject Fontaine's
position.
14. Id. at 43. Fontaine qualifies his rejection of justification by stating that there may
be one area in which killing in reasonable provocation is justified, i.e., where an actor is
wrongly attacked and, in the agitation to defend himself, uses excessive force to protect
himself. However, Fontaine argues that such cases ought to be characterized as matters of
self-defense-and not as matters of reasonable provocation, as the courts commonly charac-
terize them. See id. at 44-45. I think Fontaine is mistaken in both respects. First, although
doctrines of perfect and imperfect self-defense are appropriate regarding actors who genu-
inely but mistakenly believe that the force they are using is necessary, self-defense is
inappropriate regarding actors who, in their fury at being attacked and having to protect
themselves, know they are using excessive force. The only doctrine that is appropriate there
is reasonable provocation. Second, by conceding that killings in reasonable provocation of
the latter kind are partially justified, Fontaine implicitly concedes everything, because there
is no distinction between the latter cases and other cases in which actors intentionally retali-
ate against persons whom they know wronged them, knowing that doing so is not necessary
to protect themselves.
15. Id. at 47.
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Fontaine errs in stating that justification is confined to prevent-
ing "further unjust harm,"16 but the real problem lies elsewhere.
(Justification is not confined to preventing "unjust" harms, for it
also extends to a passerby who turns a runaway trolley into the path
of a workman on the tracks where the alternative harm is to allow
five workmen to die.1 7 And justification is not confined to prevent-
ing "further" harms, for it also extends to preventing original
harms.) The real problem, however, is that Fontaine begs the ques-
tion at issue. The question is whether the fact that wrongful
provokers morally deserve retaliation from those whom they
wrongfully provoke (which Fontaine seems to accept as true)"' is
evidence that when lawmakers provide the latter with a partial de-
fense to murder, they do so in part because they regard the
retaliation as partially justified. Fontaine's answer is "no," but only
because he assumes away the question. He simply assumes that
when lawmakers extend justification to the prevention of harms (as
they do, for example, with respect to self-defense), they also mean
to confine justification to the prevention of "greater unjust
harm [s] ," and that if courts rule otherwise, they violate "legality."9
That is, Fontaine assumes that when lawmakers provide a partial
defense for actors who kill those who wrongfully provoke them and
who morally deserve retaliation, they cannot be doing so because
they even partly regard such retaliation as partially justified, for
that would contradict the only thing that, he says, justification can
be. That is not an argument on Fontaine's part against his oppo-
nent's position. It is a simple denial of his opponent's position.
C. The Unjustly Provoked, but Cool and Collected Actor
Justification cannot be a rationale for the partial defense of rea-
sonable provocation, Fontaine argues, because justification is
inconsistent with the defense's requirement of heat of passion. To
illustrate, Fontaine juxtaposes two actors who are both wrongly
subjected to an identical indignity and who, therefore, are identi-
cal to being partially justified in killing their respective
16. Id. at 43.
17. See Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A Justification,
Not an Excuse-And Why It Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 833, 926-32 (2003) (discussing
Judith Thomson's famous "Trolley Problem," Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94
YALE L.J. 1395 (2003)).
18. Fontaine, supra note 3, at 43 ("Certainly, one who wrongfully provokes another
may well deserve to be punished .....
19. Id. at 47, 44 n.54.
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provokers-the difference being that one actor is cool, collected
and entirely self-possessed, while the other acts in a state of ex-
treme emotional arousal . If justification were a rationale for the
partial defense of reasonable provocation, Fontaine says, then the
law would grant both actors a partial defense to murder. Yet law-
makers do the opposite: they give a partial defense to the
emotional actor but deny it to the other. To Fontaine, this shows
that justification cannot be a governing rationale. Fontaine puts it
this way:
[I] n the case that heat of passion is treated as a partial justifi-
cation, there emerges a rather perverse implication. If it is
required that the killer need experience substantial emotional
upset as a result of his reasonable belief of provocation, and
that, but for his emotional upset, he would not have lost self-
control and killed the provoker, the provocation-resistant per-
son (or person who maintains his control despite being
seriously provoked) is placed squarely at a disadvantage. For it
is the provocation-resistant person in this context who,
though he has the reasonable belief that he has been seriously
provoked, and therefore is entitled to some degree of retribu-
tive aggression, fails to meet the requirements of heat of
passion and is convicted of murder. From a justification per-
spective, this is problematic because it means that the person
who exhibits greater resolve (in that he maintains his rational
self) is punished more severely, although, everything else be-
ing equal, he was wronged by the provoker every bit as much,
and therefore was just as entitled to retaliate.2'
I am afraid that Fontaine misunderstands those who advocate
the justification rationale. No one claims that partial justification is
a sufficient rationale for the partial defense of reasonable provoca-
tion.22 Rather, the claim is that actors are not entitled to a
20. Id. at 45-46.
21. Id.
22. Susan Rozelle argues that the classic partial defense of reasonable provocation
ought to be abolished and replaced with a considerably different and narrower partial de-
fense for persons who commit homicide in the rightful belief that they must use force to
defend themselves against wrongful aggressors but nevertheless err in using lethal force
where doing so is excessive. And she further argues (again wrongly, in my view) that such a
partial defense-if it existed-would consist entirely of partial justification. See Susan D.
Rozelle, Controlling Passion: Adultery and the Provocation Defense, 37 RUTGERS LJ. 197, 217, 223
(2005). Yet even she acknowledges that actors should not benefit from her proposed de-
fense unless they resort to excessive force under the "emotion [s]" of "anger and fear." Id. at
228.
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substantial mitigation in punishment from murder to manslaugh-
ter unless their homicidal conduct is both partially justified and
partially excused: partially justified by virtue of the wrongful con-
duct of their victims; and partially excused by virtue of their
emotional arousal.3 Wrongful provocation alone may suffice to
reduce a capital offense from the death penalty to extended im-
prisonment, even for an actor who is cool and collected.24 But no
one claims that wrongful provocation suffices by itself to reduce a
homicide from murder to manslaughter absent heat of passion.
D. Analogy to Assault in Reasonable Heat of Passion
Fontaine denies that partial justification can be a rationale for
reducing a provoked actor's punishment for homicide because, if it
were, he says, it would also reduce a provoked actor's punishment
for assault, something the law presently rejects. Fontaine puts it this
way:
Let us consider reactive violence in the form of criminal bat-
tery, by which a person intentionally inflicts harm or injury
upon another. If such a behavior is provoked, even egre-
giously, we do not justify the behavior when it would not
prevent further unjust harm. ... How could it be, though,
that a reactive killing committed in the heat of passion is par-
tiallyjustified if a mere provoked battery that is enacted in a
fit of rage is not? The incompatibility of this juxtaposition is
immediately evident.
25
With due respect, Fontaine's argument is flawed on three
counts. First, he is wrong to analogize homicide to assault with re-
spect to legislatively-mandated mitigation. Homicide is unique in
its range of possible criminal penalties, ranging from the most se-
vere punishment known to law to punishments that are relatively
mild, e.g., penalties for negligent homicide. Because homicide is
unique in its range of punishments, it is also unique in the atten-
tion that legislatures devote to grading it. Assault carries a much
narrower range of punishment and, hence, legislatures tend to
delegate issues regarding its mitigation to judges in sentencing. If
assault carried the same sentencing range as homicide, provoked
23. See, e.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 202-04, 246 (1991);
PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW § 14.1, at 710-11 (1997); McAuley, supra note 4, at 136-37.
24. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(d) (1980).
25. Fontaine, supra note 3, at 43-44.
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assault would almost certainly carry a legislatively-mandated re-
duced tariff too.
Second, Fontaine is mistaken in thinking that because legisla-
tures believe that reasonable provocation is sufficiently significant
to mandate mitigation regarding homicide from murder to man-
slaughter, they do not wish judges to take reasonable provocation
into account when sentencing defendants for assault. On the con-
trary, the law of sentencing specifically provides otherwise. The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines allow judges to reduce a defen-
dant's sentence when "the victim's wrongful conduct contributes
significantly to provoking [an] offense. 2 6 And the Model Sentenc-
ing and Corrections Act treats it as mitigating that "the defendant
acted under strong provocation.
Second, if the law of assault counted against partial justification
being a rationale for reasonable provocation, it would also count
against Fontaine's argument that partial excuse is its rationale. For
assault is not legislatively graded in accord with reasonable provo-
cation at all.
E. An Alternative Explanation of What is 'Justified"
Fontaine's final argument against justification being a rationale
for reasonable provocation responds to the following question: "If
justification is not the rationale, why are courts and commentators
so eager to talk about 'justification' in connection with reasonable
provocation?" Fontaine responds by arguing that the language of
'justification" is, indeed, appropriate, but it is appropriate not in
reference to the actor's conduct but in reference to his state of
28aroused anger.
I agree with Fontaine that the substantive content of the partial
defense of reasonable provocation ought to mirror Conclusion 1.
And I also agree, therefore, that what is justified in such cases is the
defendant's anger at the indignity he believes he has suffered-as
opposed to any aspect of the retaliatory harm he inflicts in re-
sponse. However, all that Fontaine shows is that, if one agrees with
him about the defense's substantive content, one can still invoke
the language of 'justification." He does not show that those who
disagree with him about the defense's substantive content-and
who use 'justification" in its traditional sense-are mistaken.
26. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.10 (2003).
27. MODEL SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS ACT § 3-108 (2001).
28. Fontaine, supra note 3, at 48.
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II. FONTAINE'S CONCEPTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
CONCLUSIONS 1 AND 2
Classically, reasonable provocation consists of a partial defense
to murder for an actor who has been unjustly subjected to an in-
dignity or outrage that leaves him emotionally agitated-and that
would agitate a person who appropriately valued his relationship to
others-and who promptly responds by killing the provoker and
the provoker alone. Every jurisdiction recognizes that reasonable
provocation in its classic form is a partial defense, and it is that
form of the defense that commentators have in mind when they
claim that it is predicated in part on justification.
Many jurisdictions have moved beyond reasonable provocation
in its classic form by expanding its parameters. Variations on the
classic defense consist of extending the defense variously to:
(1) actors who are reasonably mistaken in thinking that
30their victims inflicted such indignities or outrages,
(2) actors who, while intending to kill their wrongful
provokers, accidentally kill others,31
(3) actors who are unreasonably mistaken in thinking
that their victims inflicted such indignities or out-
32
rages,
(4) actors who intentionally kill non-provokers3 and fi-
nally,
(5) actors who, rather than feeling provoked, suffer un-
related emotional disturbances such as depression
and post-traumatic stress syndrome.34
Moreover, regardless whether they confine the defense to its classic
form or further adopt Variations 1-5, jurisdictions must resolve the
further question: "Who decides whether a hypothetical person of
reasonable values would have been emotionally agitated-the legis-
lature, the presiding judge, or the jury? 3
29. See McAuley, supra note 4, at 150-51; von Hirsch &Jareborg, supra note 3, at 252 &
n.35.
30. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1 5.2(g) (4th ed. 2003).
31. See id.; McAuley, supra note 4, at 140.
32. See LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 1 5.2(g); A.P. SIMESTER & G.R. SULLIVAN, CRIMINAL
LAW: THEORY AND DOCTRINE § 10.5(vi) (2d ed. 2003).
33. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.07(C) (2), at 580-81
(4th ed. 2006); SIMESTER & SULLIVAN, supra note 32, § 2.5 (i), at 344.
34. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. at 60-63, 70-71 (1980); ROBINSON, supra note
23, § 14.1, at 713-14; SIMESTER & SULLIVAN, supra note 32, §§ 10.5(vii), 18.2(iv).
35. See Timothy Macklem & John Gardner, Provocation and Pluralism, 64 MOD. L. REV.
815,827-29 (2001).
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Although commentators disagree about whether the classic form
of the defense is partly predicated on justification, and although
some commentators further maintain that Variation 1 is partly an
instance of partial justification, everyone would agree that Varia-
tions 2, 3, 4 and 5 are solely instances of excuse. This is significant
because it means that, if one argues, as Fontaine does, that Varia-
tions 4 and 5 are preferable to Variations 2 and 3, it is not enough
to claim, as Fontaine does, that reasonable provocation is entirely
an excuse.36 After all, Variations 2 and 3 are just as much excuses as
Variations 4 and 5. Rather, in order to persuade readers that Varia-
tions 4 and 5 are preferable to Variations 2 and 3, one is obliged to
do what Fontaine fails to do: one must defend Variations 4 and 5 as
substantively preferable to Variations 2 and 3.
III. How TO ARGUE THAT REASONABLE PROVOCATION
Is ENTIRELY AN EXCUSE
I have focused thus far on flaws in the way Fontaine argues that
reasonable provocation is entirely an excuse. I will now say some-
thing about how I think one should go about defending what
Fontaine and I both accept-namely, the substantive content and
formal classification of a reasonable provocation defense. The ar-
gument involves three steps: (1) to establish that the partial
defense of reasonable provocation must, at the very least, consist of
Variations 1 and 2; (2) to establish that it may also consist of Varia-
tion 3; (3) to establish that it may consist of Variation 4 as well;
and, finally, (4) to show that what mitigates murder to voluntary
manslaughter may also consist of Variation 5.
A. An Argument for Variations 1 and 2
The first step is to show that reasonable provocation is not even
partly a justification-even in its classic form7-and that, being
entirely an excuse, it must extend at least to Variations 1 and 2.
One way to refute the claim that classic provocation is a partial
justification is to show that if it were accepted and extended, it
would produce counterintuitive results. The claim, in essence, is
36. See Fontaine, supra note 3, at 40-41.
37. Others share the view that reasonable provocation is entirely a partial excuse. See
Joshua Dressier, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86
MINN. L. REv. 959, 974 (2002); Macklen & Gardner, supra note 35, at 819; G.R. Sullivan,
Anger and Excuse: ReassessingProvocation, 13 OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 421, 425 (1993).
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that a victim's bad behavior in inflicting a wrongful indignity upon
a defendant makes the victim's death a lesser evil, however slight,
than it would otherwise be, thus reducing a defendant's responsi-
bility for the death. Moreover, because it is an argument regarding
a victim's possessing a lesser right to life-not one regarding the
defendant's state of mind-it applies regardless of when the indig-
nity occurs and regardless of whether a defendant is aware of it. 3s
The consequences of such a claim are implausible. Among other
things, if the claim were valid, it would undoubtedly play out in
death-penalty cases where criminal penalties are the most severe
and reductions in responsibility the most significant. It would re-
quire that death-penalty statutes be amended to provide mitigation
for defendants who coolly and collectedly kill individuals who in-
flicted indignities on them at some point in the past, regardless of
whether defendants are aware of the indignities and regardless of
the malice with which they act.
The claim would also affect the relationship between murder
and manslaughter. In order to qualify for the substantial reduction
in sentence from murder to manslaughter, a defendant must show,
at the very least, that he was emotionally agitated or in heat of pas-
sion at the time he killed .39 However, if reasonable provocation in
its classic form is partly a justification, then the only additional re-
quirement, beyond the defendant's emotional agitation, is that the
victim partly deserves the harm that befalls him by virtue of having
inflicted a wrongful indignity upon the defendant, regardless of
whether the defendant is aware of it. Thus, consider the following
hypothetical:
CONSERVATIVE HATE RADIO
David, a lifetime member of the NRA, listens avidly to several
conservative talk radio hosts who claim that "liberals" are re-
sponsible for all the country's ills and must be utterly
"destroyed." Already in a fury, David learns from a news report
that the liberal candidate for President who favors gun con-
trol has just taken a lead in the state polls. Finding himself at
the candidate's headquarters, David grabs his rifle from its
rack, enters the headquarters and, in his fury, shoots and kills
38. 1 say this on the premise that justification is entirely "deeds"-based and not "rea-
sons"-based. This is not the place to defend that view, though no one does it better than Paul
Robinson. See PAUL ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 95-124 (1997);
see also Westen, supra note 12, at 299-310.
39. SeeASHWORTH, supra note 23, at 240-42; DRESSLER, supra note 33, § 31.07(B) (1).
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V, a clearly-marked pizza-delivery boy who is delivering pizza
to the headquarters, not realizing that V was having an affair
with David's wife.
If reasonable provocation in its classic form were partly a justifi-
cation, David would possess a defense to murder because he is
both partly excused and partly justified: partly excused, because he
is in a state of extreme emotional agitation, and partly justified,
because by virtue of wrongly inflicting an indignity on David, his
victim V partly deserves the harm David inflicts on him. Yet it is
counterintuitive that David would possess a defense to murder un-
der provocation in its classic form, given that he was unaware of V's
affair with his wife.40
To be sure, advocates of justification might challenge the hypo-
thetical, arguing that a victim's wrongful conduct does not partly
justify a killing unless the victim is also causally responsible for the
killing. However, that is easily incorporated into the hypothetical.
Assume, for example, that V is delivering pizza at the fatal moment
because he exchanged shifts with a fellow worker in order to later
rendezvous with David's wife. In that event, the indignity V inflicts
on David, i.e., his affair with David's wife, is causally related to
David killing V. Yet what is lacking, and what intuition seems to re-
quire, is that David be aware of the indignity, and that his
awareness kindle his heat of passion.
If we are right to conclude that justification is no part of the de-
fense of reasonable provocation in its classic form, the conclusion
is significant not only for the defense in its classic form, but also for
Variations 1 and 2. For if reasonable provocation is not even partly
a justification based on actual indignities victims inflict, the de-
fense must consist entirely of a partial excuse-that is, it must turn
on actors' state of mind regarding what victims have done, rather
than on facts about what victims have actually done. And if it con-
sists of what actors believe rather than what victims have actually
done, it ought to apply whenever actors reasonably believe in good
faith that their intended victims have subjected them to indignities
or outrages that, when they occur, are adequate in law-including
when, as in Variations 1 and 2, their victims have not actually done
SO.
At the very least, a person has a partial excuse to homicide if,
though his intended victim did nothing that even partly warrants
40. Cf DRESSLER, supra note 33, § 31.07(B)(4) (observing that the law of voluntary
manslaughter requires that the victim's provocative act cause the actor's emotional agita-
tion); SIMESTER & SULLIVAN, supra note 32, § 10.5 (i) (same).
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being killed, the person acted in an emotional state of anger at
and/or fear of his victim that (1) rendered it difficult, albeit not
impossible,41 to conform his conduct to the law, and (2) elicits
moral sympathy.
2
B. An Argument for Variation 3
The second step, which involves Variation 3, is less a matter of
logic than of judgment, a judgment that depends in turn on the
severity of punishments for murder as opposed to manslaughter.
The difference between Variations 1 and 3 is that, while both ac-
tors are mistaken in thinking their intended victims have subjected
them to indignities, actor l's mistake is reasonable, while actor 3's
mistake is unreasonable. Like all actors who kill in reasonable heat
of passion, both actors 1 and 3 are blameworthy, and they will both
be punished for the homicides they commit-the only question
being whether the charge will be murder or manslaughter. To be
sure, the actor in Variation 3 possesses an additional level of
blameworthiness because in addition to possessing the blamewor-
thiness of killing in reasonable heat of passion, the actor in
Variation 3 possesses the additional blameworthiness of having
made an unreasonable mistake. However, given that actor 1 quali-
fies for a partial defense to murder, the question remains: "Is it
appropriate to punish actor 3 for murder when the only thing that
distinguishes him from actor 1 is negligence on his part?" The an-
swer, I think, turns on the severity of the punishment for murder
within the jurisdiction and the disparity in punishments within the
jurisdiction between murder and manslaughter. The greater the
punishment for murder and the less the disparity between murder
and manslaughter, the greater actor 3's claim that he too ought to
be punished for manslaughter rather than murder when the only
thing that distinguishes him from actor 1 is negligence.
41. Rozelle denies that the partial defense of reasonable provocation is an excuse, ar-
guing that to be an excuse, the defense would have to be premised on the ground-which
she disputes-that people who kill in anger cannot control themselves. Rozelle, supra note
22, at 217-26. However, Rozelle begs the question. She assumes that partial excuse must rest
on an actor's inability to control himself, when, in reality, it rests on an actor's having great
difficulty in controlling himself. See Dressier, supra note 37, at 974-75.
42. See Sullivan, supra note 37, at 424.
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C. An Argument for Variation 4
The final step regarding the partial defense of reasonable
provocation is Variation 4, which is the most contested case. The
difference between Variations 1-3 and 4 is that actors 1-3 intend to
retaliate against persons who provoked them, while actor 4 intends
to strike a person who he knows did not provoke him. It is easier to
sympathize with actors (like actors 1-3) who have difficulty refrain-
ing from retaliating against those who profoundly wrong them
than with actors (like actor 4) who have difficulty refraining from
striking third persons, because the former must struggle with con-
flicting moral inclinations, while the latter does not. Actors 1-3
suffer from two, conflicting moral norms: a norm against taking
the law into their own hands and a norm against letting a wrong-
doer escape chastisement. The norm against taking the law into
one's own hands is, of course, the stronger, which explains why
even reasonably provoked actors are punished for the homicides
they commit. However, the conflict lessens the ability of actors who
already find themselves in a state of emotional agitation to negoti-
ate the conflict correctly.4 3 In contrast, actor 4 does not suffer from
the same moral conflict and hence has less excuse for resorting to
violence.
Nevertheless, there may be cases in which-given the severity of
the penalty for murder and the disparity in penalties between
murder and manslaughter-murder is too severe a charge for de-
fendants like actor 4. Consider, for example, the following case:
A RuINOUS PONZI SCHEME
Henry has worked all his life as an auto mechanic and, despite
lacking the benefit of an employer-based retirement account,
has succeeded in saving enough to purchase a home with a
mortgage and to retire at age 65 with a modest nest egg.
Henry is approached by Victor, a member of his church and
the brother of an acquaintance, about investing in a "Retire-
ment Investment Fund" that, Victor said, guarantees a return
of 12% annually. Henry can see that Victor's fund was success-
ful because Victor's brother and other members of the church
who had invested early with Victor are prospering hand-
somely. So, over his wife's objections, Henry takes a home
43. See Uma Narayan & Andrew von Hirsch, Three Conceptions of Provocation, 15 CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS 15, 19 (1996) (arguing that the defense of reasonable provocation ought to be
confined to such instances of moral conflict).
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improvement loan and invests it and his life savings with Vic-
tor-only to discover that Victor's fund is a giant ponzi
scheme that has swallowed Henry's life savings. Henry tries to
be stoic, but when he loses his house to foreclosure and his
wife leaves him, he stormed into Victor's brother's sumptuous
house, demanding to know where Victor is. Resentful that
Victor's brother had prospered in a scheme that left him im-
poverished, and furious that Victor's brother does not know
where Victor is, Henry shoots and kills him and, then, turns
the gun on himself and tries, unsuccessfully, to kill himself.
Henry is tried for first-degree murder, a crime that carries a
mandatory penalty of life imprisonment. Henry requests that
the jury also be instructed on voluntary manslaughter, a crime
that carries a maximum penalty of twenty years imprisonment.
Reasonable people may differ about whether first-degree mur-
der and mandatory life imprisonment are too severe in Henry's
case. The fact that they may disagree is precisely the point. If the
jury in Henry's case is instructed on voluntary manslaughter, it
might well agree that Henry qualifies for voluntary manslaughter-
or it might not. However, the jury will never have the chance to do
so unless the jurisdiction adopts Variation 4 and allows the jury to
be instructed accordingly. Nothing is lost by allowing the jury to
decide. But much may be gained because the jury, having been
properly instructed to eschew impermissible considerations such as
racism and homophobia," might agree with Henry and convict
him of manslaughter instead of murder.
D. An Argument for Variation 5
Variation 5 differs in nature from the preceding variations.
Variations 1-4 are all partial defenses of reasonable provocation,
that is, defenses predicated upon an actor's emotional agitation
which has its source in righteous anger at a triggering indignity he
believes he has suffered. In contrast, what Variation 5 adds to
Variations 1-4 is a level of partial excuse predicated upon non-
provocation-based sources of diminished responsibility, rather than
perceived violations of honor.
In some ways Variation 5 is easier to defend than Variation 4 be-
cause Variation 5 is the genus of which Variations 1-3 are species.
44. Cf Westen, supra note 2, at 157.
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Actors are partially excused under Variations 1-3 because of the
combination of two components:
(a) Extreme emotional agitation-the actors are in
states of extreme agitation that make it difficult for
them (albeit not impossible) to act toward their in-
tended victims on the basis of settled moral norms,
and
(b) Reasonableness in light of the indignities the actors per-
ceive themselves to have suffered-the public regards it
as morally reasonable for the actors to find them-
selves in states of extreme emotional agitation.
Like Variations 1-3, Variation 5 also consists of components a and
b, with one important exception: Variation 5 does not confine com-
ponent b to the source of emotional agitation that component b
contains in italics. Variation 5 does not require that the extreme
emotional agitation that actors experience and that the public re-
gards as morally reasonable be based upon perceived indignities.
Rather, Variation 5 encompasses extreme emotional agitation that
has its source in anything with which the public morally sympa-
thizes, whether that source consists of indignation that the public
regards as morally appropriate, or pathological depression or post-
traumatic stress syndrome that the public does not attribute to
moral failing on an actor's part. If actors (who are more likely to be
men than women) are partially excused for extreme agitation
based upon perceived indignities to their honor, actors (who are
more likely to be women than men) should also be partially ex-
cused for extreme agitation based upon pathological depression
that is not due to any moral failing on their part.
CONCLUSION
I originally hesitated to comment on Professor Fontaine's article
because I basically agree with him on his essential conclusions.
However, I found myself troubled by his supporting arguments. I
have tried here to show that, while Fontaine's arguments are
flawed, other arguments can be advanced to support his conclu-
sions.
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